The Serious Setback to CPI (Maoist) and Peoples’ War Path

 The Serious Setback to CPI (Maoist) and Peoples’ War Path

The serious setback to the communist revolutionary forces under the leadership of CPI (Maoist) resulting from disproportionately heavy armed onslaught by the state has spiraled out a new string of questions and disagreements on the issue of correct line of Indian revolution. The discussion embraces everything from challenging the relevance of the path of peoples’ war for Indian revolution, to various doubts and questions regarding the general necessity and viability of the armed revolution. But in this discussion, we generally don’t see any reference to practice of revolutionary mass line on basis of Mao Tse tung Thought, which is essential for success of any revolution (New Democratic or Socialist) and for successful implementation of its path (Peoples’ War or Insurrection.)

There general agreement regarding character and path of Indian revolution was present in the communist revolutionary movement that emerged on the scene with its distinct character as a result of the Naxalbari rebellion. The entire communist revolutionary camp upheld the path of New-Democratic revolution and Peoples’ War. There was basic agreement between the Chinese communist party under Mao’ leadership and the communist revolutionary camp of India regarding the character of Indian society (semi-feudal, semi-colonial), the stage (New-Democratic) and the path of the revolution (Peoples’ War). The Chinese communist party expressed its views in the prominent comment titled “Spring Thunder in India.” Later, while explaining these concepts during a meeting with a delegation of CPI(ML), Chao En-lai made critical remarks on questions concerning the tactical line of CPI (ML), and made fraternal suggestions for correction.

The communist revolutionary camp came to know about these suggestions through an open critical letter on the party line being pursued under the leadership of Com. Charu Mazumdar, released from jail by six communist revolutionary leaders of CPI (ML). Kanu Sanyal, Tajeshwar Rao and Nagbhushan Patnayak were among these 6 leaders. In the communist revolutionary camp that upheld the banner of Mao-Thought, the analysis regarding the stage and path of the Indian Revolution, different from that of the CPC under Mao’s leadership, emerged quite later.

It is a well-known fact that the sharp struggle between the two trends and lines in the communist revolutionary camp advocating peoples’ war path appeared even before the formation of CPI (ML). The line followed by one trend came to be known as the line of annihilation of “class enemies”, represented foremostly by Com. Charu Mazumdar. The second trend was primarily represented by Andhra Pradesh Communist Revolutionary Committee led by DV Rao and Nagi Reddy. Chandra Poola Reddy was also part of this organization at the time.

The concept of peoples’ war put forward by these communist revolutionaries and their practice were different from the concept and practice of Charu Mazumdar. In the opinion of this section of communist revolutionary movement, Charu Mazumdar’s concept of peoples’ war and its practice was not in conformity with teachings of Mao Tse Tung Thought. The Punjab Communist Revolutionary Committee led by Harbhajan Sohi held the same opinion. APCRC put forth its opinion through a document titled “Problems of Peoples’ War Path in India”. PCRC translated and published this document in Punjab. According to Mao Thought, peoples’ war is a war fought by people. But the “war” being fought under Charu Mazumdar’s leadership was not a “war” fought by the people. It was a string of individual killings of class enemies by armed squads of a section of communist revolutionaries with the aim of peoples’ emancipation. The major setbacks because of this line were not the setbacks of the path of peoples’ war. Rather, it was result of deviating from the path of arming the people for peoples’ war.

After a while, this left adventurist line of Com. Charu Mazumdar emerged again in a revised form. CPI (Maoist) established as the most prominent representative of this line. Unlike the line under Charu Mazumdar, this line doesn’t reject mass organizations and mass struggles, rather advocates conducting military actions and mass struggles side by side. Nevertheless, the conception of armed struggle in this line is not the conception of arming the people for the seizure of means of production. In its content this line is continuity of the line of Charu Mazumdar in revised and reformed form. The setback to the valuable communist revolutionary forces of CPI (Maoists), has a deep connection with practicing peoples’ war path in a manner diverged from Mao Thought. Nevertheless it is satisfying that considerable sections of this organization are refusing to renounce their allegiance with peoples’ cause and surrender before the reactionary enemy state despite the heavy blows. This conviction, through a necessary course of self-rectification, can provide a basis to rebound and advance forward.

It is unreasonable to dismiss the relevance of peoples’ war path for Indian revolution on the basis of the recent setback to CPI (Maoist) forces. The setback, although, is basically a result of deviating from the revolutionary mass line of Mao Thought, yet the revolutions might still face setbacks even with correct line. This has been the case in history.

The failure of 1905 revolution in Russia doesn’t indicate the incorrectness of the revolutionary path adopted by Bolshevik party. It was this path ultimately, following which the revolution in Russia achieved victory. If the path of the revolution were to be evaluated on the basis of the setbacks only, then Indian revolution faced its first setback by adopting the path of insurrection under the leadership of B.T. Ranadive. The approach to evaluate the path and line of a revolution solely on the basis of the setbacks is a superficial approach. It is not an analysis based rational approach.

We are here publishing parts of a CPRCI (ML) comment on Peoples’ War Group. CPI (Maoist) came into existence as a result of unity of PWG first with Party Unity Group and then with MCCI. The unity has provided further strength and boost to the left adventurist trend in the communist revolutionary camp.

We hope that the comment, while referring to PWG, would be helpful in understanding the practice of CPI (Maoist); and in understanding, to certain extent, connection of this practice with the recent setback. This letter that fell into our hands was issued by CPRCI (ML) as an internal letter for its ranks. The organization at the time was led by Harbhajan Sohi.

 

Apart from this, in the contention among different communist revolutionary trends and lines within the country, the People’s War Group represents the Left trend. Among the Left trends existing in the country today, it is the most prominent. The People’s War Group claims to be the all-India party, has held what it terms the party congress, claims to have created the revolutionary armed force of the Indian revolution, presently in the form of a guerrilla army, and claims to have developed different areas as primary and higher stages of guerrilla zone. It had initially focused mainly on one state but by now has extended to several. It is also the most projected communist revolutionary group, internally, and it has now been projecting itself internationally (by floating jointly with other international parties, various international platforms). It is a Left trend on the political offensive; it has had violent clashes with other groups. Within the camp it talks from the position of the party authority, it conceives of the unification process of cr. organizations principally as a process of the revolutionary elements from other groups joining it. However, to counter it ideologically-politically is more complicated, as it is not a simple Left trend.

 

4. While the People’s War Group explicitly claim the legacy of the CPI(ML) under by Charu Mazumdar, they also claim the improvement of the earlier line by the introduction of the mass line in their tactics and practice. However, the People’s War Group has introduced elements of the mass approach in its practice without adapting a mass line in an integrated way.

 

At the plane of their professed line, thePeople’s War GroupPeople’s War GroupPeople’s War Group have shed many cruder aspects of the earlier Left adventurist trend which presided over the birth of the CPI(ML) led by Charu Mazumdar. In this sense, it is not simply the continuation of the earlier Left adventurist trend, it has acquired certain different features. But it has retained, in its general tactical line and practice, the core element of the earlier Left adventurist trend: namely, the essentially vanguardist concept of the armed struggle and its process of development; more specifically, the crucial role ascribed to the activity of the armed squads in building up the revolutionary movement of the people, especially in the rural areas. From this angle, it is not a qualitatively different Left trend from the earlier Left-adventurist trend. This is a reformed/modified version of the earlier Left trend

 

5. Consequently the central problem in the People’s War Group's political practices still emanates from the flaw in their general tactical line - their Left deviation. That Left deviation, if allowed to proceed to its logical conclusion, will defeat the very objective of the tactical line. In its full blown form it amounts to reliance on a military force to carry out the revolutionary programme divorced from the democratic power acquired by the people themselves in the course of building the revolutionary movement. The disconnection of "the arming of the revolution" from "the mass revolutionary movement arming itself to protect its political gains and move towards seizure of State power" thus takes place. And so by this misconception and disconnection the armed force may remain a pro-people force but not a force of the people-an armed force for the Indian revolution but not of the Indian revolution. The party becomes an armed party, not an armed struggle party - i.e. not the leader and the core of the people's armed struggle. This prevents the conscious development of the real democratic relation between the party and the people. Further, if the party is armed whereas the people are essentially unarmed it will continue to prevent the development of this democratic relation. With the gun leading the movement, rather than the movement wielding the gun, there is an objective basis especially among the less conscious armed squad members to wield authority and power even among the people on the basis of the gun. As a result, the normal process of mobilizing democratic initiative, and unleashing of democratic energy for revolutionary practice of the masses, is undermined. Also the all-round political development of the concerned party cadre is distorted. The flaw lies in failing to realize how the communist force's/party's own development is dialectically linked with revolutionary development of the basic masses.

 

6. The main source of the People’s War Group's self-confidence comes out of their claim that they have created an armed force for the Indian revolution where there was none. The building up of a credible military force by the organization, though in the context of a quite inadequate revolutionary mass movement, also draws the admiration of sections of the masses, a sign that the masses instinctively have recognized the crucial need for a military force in order to fight the ruling classes. Indeed this is the crux of the People’s War Group's popular draw. Such an admiration among the masses is still instinctive, however, not conscious. The masses realize the need of such a military force without yet a conception of what sort of military force, how it should be brought about, and their own role in setting it up. The People’s War Group mistakes this for a conscious admiration of the party's military force which the masses own and cherish, and as a vindication of their military line.

 

Nevertheless, the credibility of the People’s War Group, among sections of the masses, rests on the fact that in the process of creating this armed force the organization has shown certain valuable revolutionary qualities. The way thePeople’s War GroupPeople’s War Group doggedly pursued its plan of nestling itself among the most oppressed and marginalized tribal masses in certain pockets of strategic importance, and of building up the armed force (of its own conception), involves the ability to muster and channel a lot of effort, motivation and struggle to overcome the obstacles in the way, along with the preparedness to bear the costs of this undertaking. Secondly, even after having come under severe State repression and having incurred serious losses, thePeople’s War Group has shown its determination to stay on the revolutionary course. These revolutionary qualities enhance the credentials of thePeople’s War Group as an earnest revolutionary force irrespective of the serious flaw in its line. ThePeople’s War Group's demonstration of these revolutionary qualities gives assurance to a section of the masses that this revolutionary organization is going to stay with them and fight for them. Basically, that is the true source and measure of their respect and support for the People’s War Group.

 

On the basis of this kind of regard of a section of the masses, however, the People’s War Group presumes itself the established leader of the concerned people and exercises authority and power over unwilling sections of the people. This breeds fear among the people which the People’s War Group seemingly fails to understand or even acknowledge as a fact. This fear indeed is a disqualification for any communist organization.

 

7. Since the target of the People’s War Group shifted from individuals of the exploiting classes to the State's security forces, institutions, bureaucracy and political leaders, the political stakes have sharply increased for both sides. The spiral of intensified attack from the State and retaliatory actions by the People’s War Group made it more urgent for the Left trend to seek mass support and mass involvement in various forms - for the purpose of the People’s War Group's survival as well as for growth. The following features have come to the fore in that group in this process.

 

i) Severe State repression drives the group even more than in the past to seek the support of the people for both physical and political survival. However, in the absence/deficiency of a mass revolutionary line and mass revolutionary practice, on the basis of which the masses would normally protect the party as part of protecting themselves, the group is driven under acute pressure to seek mass support in any which way: undertaking activity such as justice delivery, reform and construction, divorced from the masses establishing their own authority, hence in an essentially reformist/bureaucratic way. This in turn fosters the masses' dependence on the armed squads, and reinforces the hierarchical relation between the armed squads and the masses.

 

ii) There is an intensified pressure too to gather funds to buy more weaponry, in order to face the intensified State onslaught and to carry forward the building up of a credible military force. The primary potential source of funds for such a purpose - namely, voluntary collections from the masses - cannot be turned to, except in a token way. This is so because the earlier mentioned route taken to obtain mass support has ruled out such an option. (Given its approach to obtaining mass support, the party needs that it be seen as 'doing good to the people, giving largesse to them, organizing construction for them. This goes counter to mobilizing substantial funds from them voluntarily.)

 

Hence apart from the expected revolutionary forays for arms-grabbing, the party is under pressure to undertake more actions for money or for drawing on ruling class sources such as contractors and businessmen through a variety of links. This frantic effort to mobilize funds for arms exacerbates the tendency towards politically inappropriate practices or links, and towards corruption at the ground level.

 

iii) Under the intense pressure of State repression, the political organization finds it difficult to equip politically-ideologically its rapidly depleted and rapidly replenished armed contingents, and faces the problem of their opportunist relations with ruling class elements; these deviations the organization, going by its own reports, is at present struggling to counter.

 

iv) In the communist organization and in the mass revolutionary movement, there is a need for deriving inspiration and strength in order to face the ruling classes onslaught. Apart from the Ideological source, the concrete source of such inspiration and strength is the identification with the struggling masses and with their advance-viz, in the course of building their struggle-movement and organization and collectively facing repression. As this sustaining source of strength and inspiration is undermined by the undermining of the mass revolutionary movement, the organization tends spontaneously and inordinately to play up individual heroism, steeling and daring (Correspondingly, the elements drawn to and recruited into the party are attracted by individual heroism rather than by mass heroism shown in a collective fight and the collective discipline it involves.).

 

8. Notwithstanding these negative aspects of the unfolding political consequences of the problem in the People’s War 's line, it is their wanting to seek people's support that in the main will create internal pressures for self-correction, will push sections within them towards reflecting upon and correcting certain aspects of their tactical line or even the central flaw in their general tactical line. On the other hand, the pressure and urgency of seeking people's support boosts the tendency to marshall people's support through pragmatic or right opportunist practices. But there will be elements among them who will see the pitfalls in these ways for their revolutionary aim and so seek to correct them in a proper way over time.

 

9. No doubt their self-correction as a group, or as forces, can come only from within. However, the best external condition that can encourage and guide the self-correction of the Left trend is the proper practice of the revolutionary mass line including in the military aspect by cr. forces having a better grasp of the revolutionary line such that it results in the setting up of a military force of the people's revolutionary movement under the leadership of the party and under the authority of the people. Of course, part of this external condition will be the ideological struggle linked with this revolutionary practice.